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SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly," But
What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC's
New Enforcement Approach
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not been shy
about promoting its use of monetary punishments under new Chair Mary Jo
White. In September 2013, White asserted that "we must make aggressive use
of our existing penalty authority, recognizing that meaningful monetary
penalties -whether against companies or individuals -play a very important
role in a strong enforcement program."' Co-Director of Enforcement Andrew
Ceresney was even more blunt in an address several days later: "Monetary
penalties speak very loudly and in a language any potential defendant
understands .... Enforcement needs to be aggressive in our use of penalties."3
Although the rhetoric is new, the SEC's growing reliance on monetary
penalties preceded White's appointment.4 The amount of penalties that the
SEC has assessed against securities law violators in judicial and administrative
proceedings since 199o has increased at a calculated annual growth rate of 22%,
1. White was sworn in on April 1O, 2013. SEC Biography: Chair Mary Jo
White, SEC.& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/white.htm
[http://perma.cc/W6 SU-S8TR].
a. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Council of Institutional
Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137o5398412o2 [http://
2. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Council of Institutional
Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137o5398412o2 [http://
perma.cc/NC83-6BAQJ.
3. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ramps Up Fine Amounts to Deter Misconduct, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1OOO1424o527o23o39188o45791o955414946o532
[http://perma.cc/9MPE-Z7NC].
4. See infra Figure 1.
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compared to only a 4% increase in total cases filed annually.' Since 2000, the
growth has been even more striking: penalties have grown 30% year-over-year,
compared to 3% growth in cases filed. The maximum fee assessed has also
skyrocketed: Xerox's 2002 $10 million civil penalty was then "the largest ever
levied in a Commission action against a public company for financial fraud."
6
By 2006, one commentator noted that "[t]oday, a $1o million SEC penalty
would probably be considered a 'victory' for most entities settling SEC fraud
charges."7 From 2000-2013, the mean payment by corporate defendants in SEC
issuer reporting and disclosure cases was $57.9 million.! Although that figure
includes several outliers, the median payment was still $9 million.9
Despite the increase in the sums assessed, most of the money collected
goes where it always has: to the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Compensating
harmed investors was not historically an agency priority,"0 but the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) fundamentally shifted the SEC's approach to
distributing funds collected-at least nominally. Section 308 authorized the
SEC to use penalty funds, in addition to disgorgements, to compensate harmed
investors via Federal Account for Investor Restitution (Fair) Funds. The
agency's response has been seemingly enthusiastic, with multiple
proclamations about its efforts on behalf of shareholders." However, based on
S. All data were collected from SEC Annual Reports and analyzed by the author. Penalties
assessed are not necessarily identical to penalties collected, as the SEC may take ability to
pay into account in collections (for example, if the debtor has no assets, the SEC may not
collect or may reduce the amount owed proportionally).
6. SEC Annual Report 2oo2, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 5 (2002), http://www.sec.gov/pdf
/annrepo2/arozfull.pdf [http://perma.cc/7J5X-59XS).
7. Paul S. Atkins, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Feb. 16, 20o6), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/spcho216o6psa.htm [http://perma.cc/G2PJ-CEAL]. Note that these figures represent the
maximum level of penalties, not median payments.
8. Jason Hegland & Michael Klausner, SEC Practice in Targeting and Penalizing Individual
Defendants, HAPv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOvERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013, 9:23 AM),
http ://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2o 13/o9/o3/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing
-individual-defendants [http://perma.cc/9F27-MTSL]. Note that these figures relate to a
specific subset of SEC cases: those involving nationally listed firms for violation of
disclosure-related rules (e.g., fraud, books and records, and internal control rules).
9. Id.
1o. For example, Commissioner Richard B. Smith made clear in 1968 that "the Commission
attempts to avoid being a collection agency for injured investors." Richard B. Smith,
Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at Program of Continuing
Education of the Bar of the State of California: The Interest of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Private Civil Actions Under the Securities Acts 14 (Jan. 12, 1968),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1968/o11268smith.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7UC-DH93].
ii. For example, a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that "SEC




an analysis of SEC data, this enthusiastic rhetoric does not reflect reality.
Efforts to distribute funds to harmed investors have tapered off over time, such
that the vast majority of sums collected are still deposited in Treasury's General
Fund. This ensures that the SEC contributes more revenue to the government
than any other independent agency."
Figure 1.
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in seeking, where appropriate, disgorgement orders in cases where CMPs [civil monetary
penalties] are also being sought. For example, attorneys have obtained disgorgement for as
little as $1 in settlements in order to obtain authorization from the SEC Commission to
create a Fair Fund." U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0 5-67o, SEC AND CFTC
PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC
MANAGEMENT ATrENTION IS NEEDED 11 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/zo/247566.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZW63-3BMS]. The SEC's 2003 Annual Report was also the agency's first
to elevate investor compensation to a "main objective." SEC Annual Report 2003, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 24 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrepo3/aro3fall.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7M89-DBVK].
12. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
13. SEC fiscal years run through September of the respective calendar years. Totals refer to
orders obtained in SEC judicial and administrative proceedings requiring securities violators
to pay penalties or to disgorge illegal profits. All data were collected from corresponding
SEC annual reports, located at Annual Reports, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml [http://perma.cc/SR57-HQ49] and Reports, StC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/secreports.shtml [http://perma.cc
/U6EG-46CR].
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The dramatic increase in monetary sanctions with minimal changes in the
location to which the money goes raises certain questions: Does the new
strategy improve the SEC's efforts to police the securities markets and protect
investors? What are the strategy's larger implications for corporations and their
shareholders? I address these issues and argue that the net consequence of the
SEC's new approach is negative. My focus is on corporate violators, both
because they have incurred the steepest fines and because they implicate the
unique concerns that arise when third parties (that is, shareholders) foot the
bill. This Comment is organized as follows: Part I explains where the sums
that the SEC collects go. Part II examines the effectiveness of fines on
corporations and the implications for deterrence when shareholders pay for
management misdeeds. Part III highlights additional concerns stemming from
the SEC's self-interest in setting its enforcement agenda, while Part IV argues
that this dynamic is particularly troubling in light of the SEC's near-total
discretion, absent effective judicial scrutiny. Part V concludes.
I. WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?
The SEC has loudly championed its ability to collect billions of dollars
from securities law violators every year, but it has not been as clear in
identifying where all of this money goes. The answer to that question, which I
addressed by sifting through SEC Annual Reports and the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) Semi-Annual Reports, is threefold: (1) Fair Funds; (2) the new
Investor Protection Fund; and (3) the Treasury General Fund. But how much
is distributed to each, and who decides, are more complicated questions.
Fair Funds are relatively new; § 308 of SOX4 granted the agency authority
to compensate harmed investors with Fair Funds composed of both penalty
funds and disgorgements. Before 2002, the vast majority of funds collected by
the SEC were directed to the General Fund."s Although disgorgements were
available to compensate harmed investors, the SEC made limited use of the
remedy. Only after SOX was passed did investor compensation become an
explicit goal of the agency. 6 SOX gave the SEC total discretion to direct that
funds be distributed to harmed investors; neither corporations nor their
14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012).
is. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 6o FLA. L.
REv. 1103, 1113 & n.42, 1117-18 (2012).




shareholders can object to the creation of such a fund. 7 Although the text of
§ 308 does not explicitly encourage the SEC to elevate investor compensation
as an agency priority, and the available legislative history focuses on the use of
disgorgements as a tool to penalize wrongdoers rather than to benefit their
victims, the SEC nonetheless interpreted the provision as requiring a shift in
agency policy. In its 2003 Annual Report, the agency listed "[w]herever
practical, continue to seek to return recovered funds to defrauded investors" as
one of its "main objectives" going into 2004." Moreover, the agency's 2006
Statement Concerning Financial Penalties- intended to clarify the SEC's
decision-making process in seeking monetary penalties -explicitly included
"[t]he degree to which the penalty will recompense or further harm the injured
shareholders" as one of its two principal considerations in assessing a financial
penalty against a corporation. 9 Deterring future misconduct, historically the
SEC's foremost priority, was demoted to an "additional" concern.
Despite the SEC's vocal support, the creation of new Fair Funds has
dropped dramatically over time. In 2004, more than twenty funds were created
from corporate violators; only one such fund was created in 20O.' The total
amount in such funds has also decreased: the average fund created in 2005-
2006 contained more than $90 million at inception, versus $24 million for
funds created between 2007 and 2013 . ' Distribution takes a long time: 67 of
17. SEC Rule 11o6: Right to Challenge, 17 C.F.R. § 201.11o6 (2005). However, the SEC is
required to publish notice of the proposed plan of disgorgement or Fair Fund plan for
comment by non-parties under 17 C.F.R. § 201.1103.
18. SEC Annual Report 2003, supra note ii, at 24.
ig. The other principal consideration was "[t] he presence or absence of a direct benefit to the
corporation as a result of the violation." Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2oo6),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2oo6-4.htm [http://perma.cc/V2YB-6KC7].
20. See infra Figure 2. All data were collected from a list that the SEC makes publicly available.
Distributions in Commission Administrative Proceedings: Notices and Orders Pertaining
to Disgorgement and Fair Funds, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
Aitigation/fairfundlist.htm [http://perma.cc/AB8A- 3WCL]. Data include corporate
violators only. There may be additional finds created from corporate violators that are not
included on the SEC's publicized list. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private
Harm: Evidence from the SEC's Fair Fund Distribution, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2o15)
(on file with author). However, Velikonja's larger dataset displays the same pattern over
time. Id. at 26.
21. See infa Figure 3. The $200 million paid by JPMorgan increased the average significantly;
the two other Funds created in 2013 together totaled less than $5 million. Id. (data on file
with author).
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the 93 funds created from corporate violators since 2003 are still extant.' Each
step of the fund distribution process takes time; for example, the average delay
between the initial order creating the fund and the proposed distribution plan
is over two years (816 days). For those funds that have terminated, the average
time between initial order and termination was over five years. 23
One potential reason for the SEC's disinclination to create new funds is the
administrative burden of distribution. Because the SEC historically has focused
on enforcement, fund distribution is not a core competency.24 As a result, the
publicity surrounding Fair Funds has often been less than positive. Critics have
focused on the SEC's lack of coherence in its distribution policy, beyond
"reacting to pressure to negotiate large funds."'2 The agency has also struggled
in its efforts to actually distribute collected funds. Two cases in particular
highlight the agency's disorganization. In one, an enforcement against seven
specialists, an approximately $250 million fund was created for investor
compensation. Although seven years passed between the initial order creating
the fund (March 30, 2004) and the date of termination (May 26, 2011), the
administrator "encountered a number of obstacles in its efforts to identify
injured investors," such that $16o million remained at the end.26 There was
vigorous opposition on the part of one Commissioner, who argued in dissent
that closing the fund with so much money remaining was premature.27
Similarly, a 2003 case against ten investment banks and two individual analysts
resulted in a $1.4 billion "Global Research Analyst Settlement,"28 which went
from "much-heralded" to "embarrassing," in the words of Judge Pauley
22. See infra Figure 2 and underlying data (on file with author). Among terminated funds, an
average of $8 million remained, although one outlier accounted for 84% of the total
undistributed funds. The calculations for outstanding funds are on file with the author.
23. See infra Figure 4.
24. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1o-448R, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: INFORMATION ON FAIR FUND COLLECTIONS AND
DISTRIBUTIONS 3 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/ioo/96667.pdf [http://perma.cc
/LSB4-MDKE] (describing steps the SEC has taken to measure and improve its
performance in Fair Funds management).
25. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW
317, 335 (2008).
26. Order Approving Transfer of Remaining Distribution Funds to the U.S. Treasury,
Exchange Act Release No. 64,553, 1ol SEC Docket 781, at 5-6 (May 26, 2011), http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2o11/34-64553.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QTZP-3DM3].
27. See id. at lo n.5.
28. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment
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29. All data were collected from Distributions in Commission Administrative Proceedings:
Notices and Orders Pertaining to Disgorgement and Fair Funds, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/fairfiindlist.htm [http://perma.cc
/W9PS-AGQ6]. Data include corporate violators only, and exclude Fair Funds composed of
disgorgements and/or penalties paid by individual violators, including where entities were
co-respondents but were not ordered to disgorge profits or pay penalties. There may be
additional Fair Funds not advertised on the SEC's website, although that would contradict
the agency's purpose in distributing the money. The SEC's case against JPMorgan Chase &
Co. increased the average fund in 2013 significantly; the $200 million in penalties dwarfed
the two other funds created, which together totaled less than $5 million. Order Instituting
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, Exchange Act Release No.
70,458, 107 SEC Docket 4, at 19 (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigatiorVadmin/2o13
/34-7o458.pdf [http ://perma.cc/JV64-HVRE].
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Figure 3.
TOTAL DOLLARS AWARDED TO FAIR FUNDS (TOTAL AND MEAN) BY YEAR3 0
$2,000 $100
$ 1,8 0 0 .. .. ......... . ................. $...................... . . ..........  9 0
$i,6oo 58o
$1,400 i$70








2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
--- Total Funds ($M) -Mean Funds (SM)
Figure 4.
TIME DELAYS IN FAIR FUND DISTRIBUTIONS
31
4000






Initial Or d FnPsujxd P'Ia,, ind 0rdcrApprstviag First Dibursamnr lidral rdarand
Proposed PL Order Appraving Disrribution and First and Terriitia of Termination I a6]
[711 Distribution [6q] Disbursement [551 Fund
1221
M Average 5 Max
30. Distributions in Commission Administrative Proceedings, supra note 29. Some of the cases are
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brackets represent the number of funds that have reached each milestone.
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who presided over the case.34 Most damningly, Judge Pauley noted:
Of course, the April 2003 headlines regarding the "Global Research
Analyst Settlement" had faded by September, and the SEC as well as
these Defendants were indifferent to the mechanics of restitution....
In the final analysis, this Court does not question the SEC's interest in
bringing to an end improper conduct. Nor does it question the SEC's
interest in recompensing investor victims and deterring future
violations. However, whether the SEC has the institutional resolve and
commits adequate resources to reach these goals is an open question.3
By the time that fund was closed in 2oo9, almost $80 million of the originally
earmarked $432.5 million was remitted to the U.S. Treasury rather than to the
investors for whom it was intended. 4  These administrative hassles,
compounded by the resulting bad publicity, may have dampened the agency's
enthusiasm for creating new funds.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) also created a new destination for collections: the Investor
Protection Fund.3" Under Dodd-Frank, monetary sanctions not otherwise
earmarked to disgorgements or Fair Funds (or remaining in Fair Funds upon
termination) can be used for two purposes: to pay whistleblower awards36 or
to fund the SEC Office of the Inspector General's Employee Suggestion
Program.
37
The whistleblower program is designed to incentivize individuals with
"specific, credible, and timely information" to proactively contact the SEC. 38
Would-be informers have responded exactly as Congress intended; the
number of whistleblowers grew from 3,001 in FY2012 to 3,238 in FY2013 .3 9
32. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 4 02, 403-404 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
33. Id. at 411, 419-20.
34. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp.2d at 420 (directing the SEC to transfer monies
remaining in the Funds to the Treasury Department); Velikonja, supra note 20, at 30, 6o.
35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922,
124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2oo).
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2iF(g), 15 U.S.C. 5 78u-6(g)(2)(2o12).
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 4D(e); 15 U.S.C. S 78d-4(e) (2o12).
38. 2013 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program,
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-
report-2o13.pdf [http://perma.cc/FKR6-3CZN].
39. Id. at 8. Per the 2013 Annual Report, these figures include only those who included the
required whistleblower declaration. Id. at 8 n.io. Only seven weeks of whistleblower data
was available for 2011, id. at 8 n.ii, during which time there were 334 complaints, id. at 8.
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However, very few whistleblowers received compensation: in 2011-2012, only
one whistleblower received an award, for less than $50,000.40 In 2013, the
agency distributed $14,831,965.64, but more than $14 million went to one
whistleblower; four others split the remainder. 4 Nearly $44o million remains
of the initial disbursement of about $450 million to the fund.42 Consequently,
no additional amounts have been deposited since its inception: if the balance
exceeds $300 million, new collections cannot be added. 43
The SEC also uses Investor Protection Funds for its Employee Suggestion
Program. Before Dodd-Frank, SEC employees were not without recourse to
address their complaints; the Office of Human Resources (OHR) had a similar
program that it discontinued in 2011. 44 Much as with Fair Funds, use of the
new program has tapered off, from 48 suggestions and allegations lodged in
FY2o1 (including holdovers from the previous program) to 27 in FY201 3 . The
vast majority of suggestions do not involve serious concerns, and few lead to
agency action.4 For example, the Program received an allegation that many
employees received their second choice of new laptop computers, and a
suggestion that the SEC limit distribution of paper copies of the Code of
Federal Regulations to save $21,000 per year.46 Receiving and investigating
these allegations and suggestions has cost the Investor Protection Fund
40. 2012 Annual Report on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 8 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/aboul/offices/owb/annual-report-2012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L543-G74S].
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 16. The total includes $650,206.56 earned in investments in FY201 3 .
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
44. Office of Inspector Gen., Semiannual Report to Congress, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 124
(2o11), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/reppubs/2o1/sar fall-2on1final_5o8
.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZU23-QYR3]. There were problems with OHR's program, however.
See Office of Inspector Gen., Audit of SEC's Employee Recognition Program and Recruitment,
Relocation, and Retention Incentives, SEC & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 25 (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/492.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7W9-99YR]. In fact, some
of the initial suggestions made to the Employee Suggestion Program in 2011 were actually
leftovers from the previous program. Semiannual Report to Congress, supra, at 20-21.
45. Office of Inspector Gen., Semiannual Report to Congress, supra note 44, at 124; Office of
Inspector Gen., Semiannual Report to Congress, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
27-30 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/reppubs/2013/oig-fall2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XYD2-QZHA].
46. Office of Inspector Gen., Semiannual Report to Congress, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 29 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/reppubs/2o13/oig




$233,556.65 over the past three years; in two of those
exceeded the sum paid to whistleblowers.47
Figure 5.
INVESTOR PROTECTION FUND BUDGET AND ACTIVITIES
4 8
years, the allocation
$M FY 2oo FY 2o11 FY 2o2 FY 201 3
Balance of Fund at beginning of
preceding fiscal year (FY)
Amounts deposited into or credited to
Fund during preceding FY 451"91 - - -
Amount of earnings on investments
during preceding FY 0.99 0.76 0.65
Amount paid from Fund during - 0.05 14.83
preceding FY to whistleblowers
Amount disbursed to OIG during - 0.11 0.07 0.05
preceding FY
Balance of Fund at end of the
preceding FY 451.91 452-79 453.43 439.20
# whistleblowers N/A 334 3001 3238
# awards N/A 0 1 4
If the SEC is not creating new Fair Funds or adding money to its Investor
Protection Fund, then where is the SEC putting the sums it collects? Where it
always has: the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Despite the SEC's rhetoric about
compensating harmed investors, funds earmarked for its two investor
compensation programs have declined dramatically as a percentage of the
SEC's total assets, from approximately 28% in 2005 to 13% in 2013. 4 9
47. See infra Figure 5 and underlying data.
48. All data were collected from the SEC Office of the Whistleblower annual reports. See 2013
Annual Report, supra note 38, at 1, 15-16; Annual Report on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Program: Fiscal Year 2o12, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION IO (2012), http://www.sec.gov
/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZS2X-YQ.TR]; Annual Report
on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program: Fiscal Year 2011, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
5, 9 (2Ol1), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-2oil.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B4XH-5F62].
49. All data were collected from SEC Annual Reports. See infra Figure 6 and underlying data
(on file with author).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Figure 6.
PERCENTAGE OF SEC ASSETS ALLOCATED TO FUND BALANCE WITH TREASURY
VS. INVESTMENTS (DISGORGEMENT AND PENALTIES FUND AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION FUND)5 °
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So. All data were collected from the SEC's corresponding annual reports. See Fiscal Year 2013
Agency Financial Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 34 tbl.1.2 (2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2o13.pdf [http://perma.cc/6VS9-QMUU]; Fiscal
Year 2o12 Agency Financial Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 32 tbl.l.2 (2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2ol2.pdf [http://perma.cc/DSQL-S98D]; FY 2011
Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 32 tbl.1.2 (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2on1.pdf [http://perma.cc/FKP5-N7R6]; FY 2010
Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82, 101 n.13 (2010),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2o1o.pdf [http://perma.cc/88BD-L9ZR]; Putting
Investors First: 2oo9 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. &EXCHANGE COMMISSION 64,
82 n.12 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2oo9.pdf [http://perma.cc/XSF4-
SUTG]; 2oo8 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 59, 75
n.12 (2008), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2oo8.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZR7
-PEXB]; 2007 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 14
tbl.l.3 (2007), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2oo7.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3L4
-UHDB]; 2oo6 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 33 exh.
1.8, 6o-61, 77 n.6, 78 n.7 (20o6), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2oo6.pdf [http://
perma.cc/QD73-F2Z6]; 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC. & EXCHANGE




Although disgorgements and penalties cannot be used directly for SEC
expenses, it is a point of pride within the agency that it is a net contributor to
the Federal Government's budget and any appropriations from Congress are
"fully offset."5 ' To be sure, the SEC would be a net contributor even without
violator fines: securities transactions fees alone fully offset the SEC's total
FY2013 budget request."2 Up to $50 million in additional registrant filing fees
are deposited in the SEC's Reserve Fund, created under 15 U.S.C. § 78d(i) to
be used "as the Commission determines is necessary"; the remainder of those
fees also go to the General Fund. 3 Even if these additional funds are not
factored into actual SEC expenses, though, they are considered to be part of the
SEC's total budget, which has steadily increased as a result.
There are only six other entities that are expected to provide any net
contributions to the Treasury General Fund in 2014, and none provide sums
remotely close to the SEC's expected $737 million contribution.' Potentially as
a result of its generosity to the rest of the government, the SEC has enjoyed
rapid expansion in the past five years. According to one analysis, the SEC's
budget grew by 46% from FY2oo8-FY201 3 , compared to 24% for the Federal
Government as a whole, and 14% GDP growth.'5 This disproportionate growth
does not look like it will soon slow: the SEC's 2014 budget represents a nearly
30% increase over 2013 ($i.6o8 billion vs. $1.254 billion).56 By comparison, the
S. In Brief FY 2013 Congressional Justification, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf [http ://perma.cc/K5JZ-QXXW].
52. Id.
53. See FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 18 n.1 (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf [http://perma.cc/MS8R2LSM]
(describing this statutory provision).
54. Those funds were generated by: Civilian Property Realignment Board ($120 million),
District of Columbia ($1 million), Federal Communications Commission ($251 million),
Federal Maritime Commission (si million), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (si million),
and Vietnam Education Foundation ($5 million, although the entirety of that amount is
contributed by other federal governmental agencies, USDA, and USAID). Negative
subsidies from loans made by the Export-Import Bank of the United States are excluded.
The Budget for Fiscal Year 2014: Other Independent Agencies, OrF. MGMT. & BUDGET (2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2o14/assets/oia.pdf [http://
perma.cc/79L4-RJQS].
55. David Burton, Lack of Resources Is Not the Reason for SEC Tardiness, HERITAGE FOUND.: THE
DAILY SIGNAL (Dec. 10, 2013), http://dailysignal.com/2o13/12/io/lack-resources-reason-sec-
tardiness [http://perma.cc/8 ZUJ-9R3Y].
56. The Budgetfor Fiscal Year 2014: Other Independent Agencies, supra note 54, at 1313.
221
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
total outlay for all "discretionary" programs shrunk by 2% between 2013 and
2014 -
57
II. DO FINES DO ANY GOOD?
Given the magnitude of monetary penalties, it is surprising that there is
little evidence of their effectiveness in deterring securities law violations.
Indeed, for public companies, evidence suggests that the opposite may be true.
There is ample evidence that individuals can be deterred by the threat of
financial penalties when they pay the cost themselves.~s However, if their
employer (or its shareholders) pays, the deterrent effect is undermined.
Corporate fines for securities law violations present a classic example of the
agency problem: managers who violate securities laws may gain from
misconduct, especially in the short-term, while long-term losses from fines are
spread across shareholders. s9 As former SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman
once noted in voting against the imposition of a fine on a corporation, "When
the boards and management are agreeing to these penalties, they're agreeing to
pay with other peoples' money.,,6o
Depending on how punishments are structured, even a massive fine may
not directly affect executive compensation; instead, the sum is effectively split
among shareholders. To borrow a phrase from an eminent securities law
professor, this system is "akin to punishing the victims of burglary for their
failure to take greater precautions. ", 61 Although executives may be deterred by
other means -including the possibility of being fired by the corporation for the
57. Fiscal Year 2015 Budget of the U.S. Government, OFF. MGMT. &
BUDGET 170 tbl.S-5 , http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2o1S
/assets/budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4B3-AT3J]. "Discretionary" is a technical term for
government spending on programs other than Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and
other mandatory programs.
58. See, e.g., Todd L. Cherry, Financial Penalties as an Alternative Criminal Sanction: Evidence from
Panel Data, 29 ATLANTIc ECON. J. 450, 450 (2001). See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavel, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45
(2000).
sg. The agency problem, or moral hazard, arises from the mismatch in incentives between
shareholders and corporate managers. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
60. Deborah Solomon, As Corporate Fines Grow, SEC Debates How Much Good They Do, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2004, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1oo21198122471832 [http://
perma.cc/W8EK-HMW2].
61. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its




original misconduct or of being assessed a fine individually by the SEC -they
are not personally liable for fines assessed against the corporation.
Although the circularity problem is particularly troubling when
shareholders do not share in any of the initial benefits of misconduct (for
example, accounting fraud), the concern is not limited to these violations.
Circularity is exacerbated by a temporal disconnect: if the company has
sufficient liquidity, then shareholders enriched by the initial misconduct have
likely already sold their stock. Remaining shareholders are then doubly
penalized: by the penalty itself and the "reputational penalties" that companies
suffer after SEC actions, which can be higher than the fines themselves.
62
Enforcement actions also can divert management's attention, leading to further
lost revenue. This timing issue has distributive consequences; it benefits
investors who sell rapidly (for example, hedge funds) and penalizes those who
hold for longer periods (for example, retail investors). 6' This is not to suggest
that corporate fines are never appropriate. For example, requiring a corporation
to disgorge the profits gained from a price-fixing scheme appropriately
requires the beneficiary of the violation to pay, and this may deter similar
future misconduct. However, these considerations suggest the importance of
paying careful attention to the particular factors involved before any fine is
assessed.
Indeed, Congress explicitly urged such caution in fining public
corporations when it initially granted the SEC the authority to seek civil
monetary penalties. The legislative history of the 199o Securities Enforcement
and Penny Stock Reform Act includes the following passage:
[B]ecause the costs of such penalties may be passed on to shareholders,
the Committee intends that a penalty be sought when the violation
results in an improper benefit to shareholders. [When] shareholders
are the principal victims of the violations, the Committee expects that
the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual
offenders acting for a corporate issuer.64
62. See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QuANTiTATIVE ANALYSIS S81 (2008) (arguing that reputation losses impose the largest
penalties for financial misrepresentations). Karpoff's study was limited to accounting fraud.
However, Engelen and van Essen demonstrate that companies suffer reputational penalties
from a wide range of misconduct, at least so long as the misconduct directly involves related
parties. See generally Peter-Jan Engelen & Marc van Essen, Reputational Penalties in Financial
Markets: An Ethical Mechanism?, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN TIMES OF TuRMom, at 55
(Wim Vandekerckhove et al. eds., 2011).
63. Coffee, supra note 61, at 156o.
64. S. REP. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Deterring future misconduct is not merely a positive side effect of enforcement;
according to Congress, it is one of the primary reasons we have the securities
law regime we do.
The legislative history of the Reform Act makes clear that broadening
monetary penalties was "intended to permit the Commission to achieve the
appropriate level of deterrence." 6s  To quote Judge Rakoff, "Where
management deceives its own shareholders, a fine most direcdy serves its
deterrent purposes if it is assessed against the persons responsible for the
deception." 66 If these penalties do not produce the desired deterrent effect
because they are assessed against the corporation, rather than the individuals
engaged in misconduct, then it is hard to argue that they are worth the COSTS.67
III. WHOM DOES THE SEC TARGET?
Inability to deter misconduct is one problem with corporate monetary
penalties, but it is not the only one. At least two additional, related issues
prompt consideration: the way in which the SEC prioritizes enforcement, and
the lack of meaningful checks on the agency. This Part addresses the former;
the following Part discusses the latter.
The SEC has considerable latitude to prioritize its enforcement agenda.
This raises the possibility that the SEC will select targets not because they are
the worst violators, but for improper reasons such as agency or individual self-
aggrandizement. For example, empirical evidence suggests that the SEC targets
"deep pockets" for whom large-dollar fines will not induce insolvency, as well
as violators whose cases will engender positive press. One study found a
marked increase in enforcement actions targeted at larger companies starting in
65. H.R. REP. No. loi-616, at 13 (1990).
66. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), lo Civ. o215(JSR), 201o WL 624581, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (Rakoff, J.).
67. There is some evidence that some types of enforcement actions may result in reputational
penalties for management, including reducing compensation or firing individuals. See
generally Anup Agrawal & Tommy Cooper, Corporate Governance Consequences of
Accounting Scandals: Evidence from Top Management, CFO and Auditor Turnover (Oct.
2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=970355 [http://perma.cc/SsYM
-6FSS]. But see JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION (2013). Macey
argues that reputational penalties are no longer sufficient to discipline management because
even those who are criminally indicted, like Michael Milken, emerge with their reputations
largely intact. Id. at 111-13. It is also important to keep in mind that executives may suffer
reputaional penalties from the discovery of the underlying misconduct, separate and apart
from specific regulatory penalties.
124:20 9 2014
SEC MONETARY PENALTIES
2002.68 After 2002, the mean market capitalization of companies facing SEC
action was over six times greater than that of companies facing private
litigation alone; pre-2oo2, the reverse was true.6 9 Comparing private and
public enforcement provides strong evidence that the SEC is not just pursuing
more egregious violations in prioritizing larger companies; private litigants
have even more incentive to target "deep pockets."' Another study, focusing
on the options backdating scandal, supports a publicity-seeking theory: it
found that the SEC increased related investigations - and decreased
investigations of other crimes-as the level of media scrutiny of option
backdating increased.7 More troubling, the quality of investigations declined
over the period, suggesting the SEC was scraping the barrel to accommodate
public outrage, rather than investigating substantive violations.'
Although focusing on a "hot" issue may bring in fewer dollars,73 both the
"deep-pockets" theory and the "publicity-seeking" theory can be explained by
the incentives faced by the agency and its officials. Niskanen's model of the
budget-maximizing bureaucrat is helpful in understanding how these
incentives operate.74 Niskanen posits that bureaucrats attempt to maximize
their agencies' discretionary budgets in order to maximize their own utility,
and that they are largely successful in these attempts.7 A bureaucrat's utility is
determined by, inter alia, "salary, perquisites .... public reputation, power....
[and] output."76 The "revolving door" of modern political careers adds an
important gloss; even if salaries are standardized across federal agencies,
68. James D. Cox et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things
Changed Since Enron?, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (2005).
69. Id. at 902.
70. This incentive is generated partially because of the failure of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 972-73.
71. Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating
Investigations, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 542, 542-44 (2013).
72. See id. at 576. The study looked at stock price reactions to SEC announcements of
investigations, follow-on private litigation, criminal prosecutions, the outcome of the SEC's
investigation, and the magnitude of the accounting error as proxies for the quality of an
investigation, all of which declined over the period. Id.
73. For example, companies targeted for backdating were smaller than those accused of other
accounting fraud, and later investigations were less likely to generate monetary penalties. Id.
at 565, 570-73.
74. See THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 4-6 (Andr6 Blais &
St~phane Dion eds., 1991).
75. Id.
76. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (1971).
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officials within more powerful agencies with more complex regulatory regimes
can demand higher wages upon entering the private sector. 77
IV. ARE THERE ANY MEANINGFUL CHECKS ON SEC ENFORCEMENT?
The force of the incentives that the SEC faces in prioritizing its agenda is
particularly troubling given the lack of meaningful checks on SEC enforcement
power. Although all administrative agencies are theoretically "checked" by
judicial review, in practice the judiciary does not provide much of a constraint
on SEC enforcement actions. Like all administrative agencies, the SEC enjoys
considerable deference in judicial review.78 Because of the SEC's particular
focus, it might receive even greater latitude: "[F]or the field of technical and
economic regulations, agency expertise leaves the Justices less equipped to
understand the issues than specialized agencies."79 As a result, the SEC has a
high win rate at trial: 8o% since 2011, according to Chair White."'
Moreover, the SEC can avail itself of administrative proceedings that
effectively bypass the judiciary. Administrative proceedings are overseen by
administrative law judges - employees of the SEC - rather than Article III
judges. There is no jury, and no right to discovery.8' Consequently, the
timeline for administrative cases is condensed compared to trial: administrative
hearings must be completed within 270 days of the SEC's complaint. SEC
reliance on these adjudications has grown rapidly; whereas civil cases
outnumbered administrative proceedings as recently as 2005, there were nearly
77. MACEY, supra note 67, at 14; see also David Lucca et al., Staff Report No. 678: The Revolving
Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (June 2014), http://www
.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr678.pdf [http://perma.cc/4795-4W3W].
78. Agency interpretations of their own regulations receive deference unless they are not
"reasonable." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
79. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Supreme Court's Deference Continuum, An
Empirical Analysis (Chevron to Hamdan), 96 GEO. L.J. 1O83, 1144 (2008); see also Steven
Croley, The Scope of Chevron 2-3 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dan/aba/migrated/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc [http://
perma.cc/U3KU-XBGY] ("The Supreme Court has made it dear that Chevron deference is
not to be confined to interpretations occasioned by agency rulemaking, however, but
extends also to agency interpretations made in connection with a formal adjudication,
including enforcement actions.").
So. Andrew Tangel & Jim Puzzanghera, SEC'S Mary Jo White Wants Companies to Fess Up,
L.A. TimEs, Jan. 1, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2o/jan/ol/business/la-fi-sec-white
-20140102 [http://perma.cc/UB23-NGS 9].
si. See John H. Sturc et al., SEC Investigations and Enforcement Actions, in SEcuzrrES
LITIGATION: A PRACrmONER's GuiDE 15-30 (Jonathan Dickey ed., 2011).
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twice as many administrative proceedings as civil actions in 2012."
Commentators expect this trend to continue, particularly because Dodd-Frank
broadened the reach of these proceedings by enabling the SEC to impose
financial penalties on any offender, rather than only those it directly regulated
(for example, broker-dealers and investment advisors), as before.8 '
Figure 7.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INITIATED: PERCENTAGE OF CASES BROUGHT AS CIVIL
ACTIONS VS. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
84
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82. See infra Figure 7. The SEC did not provide the 2013 breakdown between civil actions and
administrative proceedings, contrary to previous practice.
83. See, e.g., 2013 Mid-Year Securities Enforcement Update, GIBSON DUNN 3 (July
15, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2o13-Mid-Year-Securities
-Enforcement-Update.pdf [http://perma.cc/S 8YB-PgHV].
84. Each bar represents the percentage of civil actions minus the percentage of administrative
proceedings. For example, in 2002, 53.1% of cases were brought as civil actions and 46.9% as
administrative proceedings, resulting in a 6.2% difference in favor of civil actions.
............ -[I --- 1 1-
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In reality, few public companies go through either judicial or
administrative proceedings because most opt to settle instead. Litigation is
particularly risky for a public company: even if it ultimately prevails, the
uncertainty of pending litigation can be disastrous. The paradigm example of
this phenomenon is Arthur Andersen. The Supreme Court ultimately
overturned Andersen's guilty verdict, but it was "little more than a Pyrrhic
victory": "Andersen ... lost its clients after being indicted on obstruction of
justice charges and has no chance of returning as a viable enterprise.8
Moreover, "the pendency of an investigation places a cloud over the
corporation that may inhibit its access to capital markets, chill relationships
with vendors and customers, and distract and demoralize management.,
86
Depending on the structure of the settlement, companies can also avoid an
onslaught of follow-on private suits. 87
Settlement is also preferable from the SEC's perspective, given the costs of
litigation. Since "settled injunctive actions rarely receive any detailed judicial
scrutiny,"88 these actions ensure a quick "victory" that can be publicly touted.
Indeed, many critics have lamented the rise in "sue-and-settle" cases, in which
the SEC charges a corporation, settles for large sums, but does not require
8S. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Overturn Conviction of Arthur Andersen, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2005, http://www.nytimes.con/200/o5/31/business/31wire-andersen.html [http://
perma.cc/33BY-4KUE].
86. Sturc et al., supra note 81, at 15-2 to -3.
87. Admitting guilt in a settlement could expose defendants to "collateral estoppel": "This
means that a defendant could, as a result of the admission in the SEC settlement, be
precluded from challenging liability in the private civil litigation." Examining the Settlement
Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
79 (2013) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
88. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and
Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 394 (2oo8)
(emphasis omitted). The legal travail surrounding the SEC's settlement with Citigroup is
also a case in point. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Rakoffs
rejection of the settlement deal with Citigroup on the grounds that "it is not within the
district court's purview to demand 'cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions
or by trials' . . . as to the truth of the allegations in the complaint as a condition for
approving a consent decree." SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2014)
(quoting SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
89. See MACEY, supra note 67, at 92 (quoting Peter J. Henning, Behind Rakoffs





anyone to admit responsibility.9" The SEC recently restricted neither-admit-
nor-deny settlements, but it is too soon to gauge the impact of this move. 9'
Even before the settlement or litigation phase of an enforcement action, the
SEC's policy of penalizing non-cooperation further skews the outcome in the
SEC's favor. It is surely sound public policy to encourage defendants to
cooperate with investigations- some analysis even suggests that optimal
enforcement requires some degree of self-reporting and compliance 92 - but the
SEC has been accused of exerting undue pressure on defendants to divest
themselves of appropriate legal protections, including the attorney-client
privilege. 93 One study found that cooperation increased over time, particularly
after the 199o Remedies Act, and even more so after 2000. 9 4 Between 1978 and
1989, only 3.1% of enforcement actions cite company cooperation, compared to
63.4% in 2010. 9' Furthermore, researchers found that larger firms are more
likely to cooperate than smaller firms; the average market capitalization of
cooperators is $13.1 billion compared to $4.0 billion for non-cooperators. 6 In
addition to the deep pockets hypothesis discussed above and the likelihood that
large public companies will settle rather than litigate, the increased likelihood
of cooperation on the part of large public companies provides yet another
reason for the SEC to target them. The SEC can investigate with the company's
help and then garner headlines by assessing hefty monetary penalties that firms
9o. See, e.g., id. at 272-73; see also Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com
/articles/archives/2o14/jan/og/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions [http://perma
.cc/RE29-SWMM] (discussing the reasons for the recent lack of prosecutions against high-
level executives).
91. White, supra note 2.
92. Rebecca Files et al., Does It Pay for Firms to Cooperate with Regulators? 7-8 (July 7, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (citing Jennifer Arlen, Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process
Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
44 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012)), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026282 [http://
perma.cc/VHW2-3GR8].
93. The Seaboard Report apparently generated a widespread perception that companies must
waive attorney-client privilege to be seen as sufficiently cooperating (the so-called "culture
of waiver"), which proved controversial for the SEC and DOJ. See, e.g., Sturc et al., supra
note 81, at 15-22 to -24.
94. Rebecca Files et al., The Monetary Benefit of Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement
Actions for Financial Misrepresentation 16 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Files et al., Monetary Benefit]. For a more recent version of the
study, see Files et al., supra note 92.
95. Files et al., Monetary Benefit, supra note 94, at 16.
96. Id. at 19.
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see as merely a "cost of doing business,"97 all with only minimal checks to
ensure that the agency is penalizing the appropriate actors or targeting the
most egregious violations.
CONCLUSION
By every available metric -litigated cases won, billions of dollars assessed,
number of headlines generated-the SEC's enforcement division has been
remarkably successful in the past few years. Whether these efforts have been
effective in protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient
markets, and facilitating capital formation is not as clear. The SEC's use of
monetary sanctions has grown rapidly, without much critical consideration
given to the effects of the new focus on the alleged violators themselves or the
market as a whole.
There are multiple reasons to be concerned. Particularly for public
corporations, the source of the largest sums garnered and circularity and
temporal problems may prevent optimal deterrence. The absence of deterrence
is particularly concerning given that the SEC's budget grows in tandem with
the growth in monetary penalties. The SEC's near-total discretion over its
enforcement strategy raises an additional issue: if the SEC targets those with
the deepest pockets or those most likely to garner publicity, then other equally
or more culpable violators might be able to operate with impunity. Insofar as
those violators will not otherwise be sanctioned by private investors, the SEC's
approach is suboptimal. Yet without any checks, including judicial review, it is
difficult to discern whether the SEC's approach is the right one in any
individual case, let alone systematically.
The SEC has not always sought monetary penalties from securities law
violators, as a punishment in itself or on behalf of harmed investors. Indeed,
the SEC's initial remedies for violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were limited
to injunctions and disgorgement of profits, although the latter was not widely
used until the 197os. 98 The SEC was not authorized to seek civil monetary
sanctions until 1984, and then only for insider trading violations. 99 Indeed,
both Congress and the SEC itself historically warned against the imposition of
fines against public corporations. The legislative history of the Securities
97. MACEY, supra note 67, at 23; see also id. at 215-16 (concluding that "SEC regulators seek to
enhance the power of their organization ... [and] advance their own careers," and that
"regulation has entirely lost its value as a signal of weak reputation").
98. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 88, at 383.
99. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 72u-1(a)(1) (2012)).
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Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 199o,00 which initially
granted the SEC authority to seek civil monetary penalties in enforcement
cases, indicates that Congress was particularly concerned about inadvertently
penalizing shareholders:
[B]ecause the costs of such penalties may be passed on to shareholders,
the [Senate] Committee [on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs]
intends that a penalty be sought when the violation results in an
improper benefit to shareholders. In cases in which shareholders are the
principal victims of the violations, the Committee expects that the SEC,
when appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual offenders
acting for a corporate issuer.'1
Similarly, in a 2006 statement," 2 the SEC differentiated between cases where
penalties assessed against corporate violators would be appropriate and where
they would not be:
[T]he strongest case for the imposition of a corporate penalty is one in
which the shareholders of the corporation have received an improper
benefit as a result of the violation; the weakest case is one in which the
current shareholders of the corporation are the principal victims of the
securities law violation.'o3
This historical background suggests that there are viable alternatives to the
current strategy. The SEC need not always impose monetary sanctions against
corporations, and when it does so, it can tie the amount to the gains generated
by wrongdoing. The SEC can also refocus its monetary penalties on individuals
within corporations, potentially strengthening the deterrent effect of these
penalties. Long before the SEC had the authority to pursue monetary
sanctions, it availed itself of other regulatory tools, including censures,
deregistrations, and cease-and-desist orders. All of these tools are still
available - and are still used by the SEC - but they do not raise the concerns
regarding self-interest or agency aggrandizement articulated above. Given the
clear costs of centering its enforcement program around large-dollar sanctions
and absent clear benefits of that strategy over alternatives, the SEC would be
best served by refocusing its enforcement agenda accordingly.
1o. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
1m. S. REP. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990) (quoted in Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, supra note 19).
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
103. Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, supra
note 19.
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Because the SEC's current incentives likely preclude the agency itself from
desiring such a change, other actors may need to intervene. Congress could
clarify the goals toward which the enforcement program should be oriented.
The courts could likewise meaningfully assess SEC actions and settlements,
rather than "rubber-stamping" the cases that the agency brings. The result
might just be a more robust and fair market that protects investors and deters
potential violators better than the current system.
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